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Using 2006 General Social Survey data, the authors compare levels
of segregation by race and along other dimensions of potential social
cleavage in the contemporary United States. Americans are not as
isolated as the most extreme recent estimates suggest. However,
hopes that “bridging” social capital is more common in broader
acquaintanceship networks than in core networks are not supported.
Instead, the entire acquaintanceship network is perceived by Amer-
icans to be about as segregated as the much smaller network of close
ties. People do not always know the religiosity, political ideology,
family behaviors, or socioeconomic status of their acquaintances,
but perceived social divisions on these dimensions are high, some-
times rivaling racial segregation in acquaintanceship networks. The
major challenge to social integration today comes from the tendency
of many Americans to isolate themselves from others who differ on
race, political ideology, level of religiosity, and other salient aspects
of social identity.
INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long recognized that Americans are socially divided along
multiple dimensions. It is generally believed that social interaction is most
highly segregated along racial lines, but other forms of segregation have
received increased attention in the past decade. Skocpol and Fiorina
1 This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-0532231), by
the Applied Statistics Center of Columbia University, and by the Russell Sage Foun-
dation. We acknowledge research assistance from Masanao Yajima and from Rozlyn
Redd, and thank Rozlyn Redd, Matt Salganik, and Delia Baldassarri for their com-
ments on this article and at earlier stages of this research project. Previous versions
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(1999), for example, contend that patterns of civic engagement have be-
come more polarized by class, while Evans (2003) and Rosenthal (2004)
argue that Americans have become more polarized by political ideology.
Political conflict between proponents of secular and religiously orthodox
values has been especially prominent since the Reagan presidency (Green
1996; Brooks 2002). Coupled with this concern about high levels of seg-
regation and polarization in contemporary American society is new evi-
dence that close ties even to people like oneself have diminished in the
past 20 years (McPherson et al. 2006).
Given the strong interest scholars profess in the topic of social inte-
gration, it is remarkable how little hard evidence we have about the extent
to which Americans have contact with people who differ from themselves
on core status and values dimensions. Most studies use indirect measures
or focus exclusively on friendships, the people that one discussed impor-
tant matters with, or other operationalizations to generate the set of people
to whom one has strong ties. Little is known about how religion, political
ideology, or social class work to structure the broader acquaintanceship
networks of Americans. In light of the huge number of studies that focus
on residential segregation, it is ironic but true that the same lacunae of
research exists for racial segregation in acquaintanceships. As a conse-
quence, we do not know whether religion, class, or political ideology rival
race in shaping everyday patterns of social interaction. We do not know
whether Americans have more integrated social networks at their work-
place and in voluntary associations than they do in their families or neigh-
borhoods. While these issues are the focus of much speculation, there is
little firm knowledge about them.
Using data from the 2006 GSS, we compare levels of segregation by
race and across the principal dimensions of potential social cleavage in
contemporary America. We study both the relatively small networks based
on trust relationships and the much larger acquaintanceship networks of
Americans in order to answer three major questions. First, how socially
connected are Americans? Second, to what extent do these connections
cross social boundaries defined by race, socioeconomic markers, political
ideology, and religiosity? Third, is the expected high level of homophily
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Dynamics Research Group at Yahoo, at the Inequality and Social Integration research
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the spring 2009 seminar series of the Center for Demography and Ecology at the
University of Wisconsin, Madison. We thank Richard Breen and the other participants
at these seminars, Nan Lin, Howard Aldrich, and also three AJS reviewers for their
helpful comments and suggestions. Please direct correspondence to Thomas A. DiPrete,
Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison,
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in core networks offset by greater diversity in the larger group of people
that constitute a person’s acquaintances? Our answers to these questions
offer a mix of reassurance and concern to those who value social inte-
gration. We find that Americans are not as isolated as suggested by recent
estimates obtained from the 2004 GSS (McPherson et al. 2006). However,
hopes that “bridging” social capital is more common in broader acquain-
tanceship networks than in core networks cannot be supported by our
findings with the 2006 GSS data. Instead, the entire acquaintanceship
network appears to be about as segregated as the much smaller network
of close ties. We find that social divisions based on religiosity, political
ideology, family behaviors, and socioeconomic standing are high and in
some cases rival racial segregation in their intensity. Social polarization
rather than social isolation appears to be the greater impediment to social
integration in the United States today. Our most positive result is the
surprising integrative role of the family. The growing heterogeneity of
American families, coupled with the difficulty of hiding potentially ob-
jectionable statuses from other family members, appear to produce family-
based social networks that are less segregated on a number of dimensions
than are networks based on workplace, neighborhood, or voluntary as-
sociations.
SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND INTERPERSONAL ASSOCIATION
It has long been known that people prefer to associate with others who
are similar to themselves, which produces segregation in people’s social
networks along a variety of core demographic statuses, including race/
ethnicity, age, education, and income (Coleman 1961; Blau 1977; Billy et
al. 1984; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson et al. 2001). The
homophily principle is so powerful that its existence is taken as a given
in the social capital literature. Two other issues, however, are considered
to be highly problematic in the contemporary United States and arise
from the recent and growing literature on social integration in modern
Western societies. One issue concerns absolute levels of social isolation;
that is, the quantitatively measurable extent to which people are socially
connected to others, including people like themselves. The second issue
concerns relative isolation; that is, the extent to which people—despite
their tendencies toward homophily—have sufficient ties with people who
are different from themselves to be exposed in a meaningful sense to a
broad spectrum of attitudes, beliefs, and opinions. Social isolation is the-
oretically linked in the contemporary literature to the issue of social in-
clusion or exclusion, which especially in the European context has been
closely tied to concerns about social inequality and poverty. Social inclu-
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sion is defined by the European Social Fund as the ability for individuals
“to participate fully in economic, social and cultural life and to enjoy a
standard of living and well-being that is considered normal in the society
in which they live” (CEU 2004). People are included in the “life of the
community” (Sen 1992, p. 39) through their social capital as well as
through consumption of goods and services made possible by an adequate
income. From this characteristically European perspective, social inclu-
sion or exclusion has both a material aspect, which affects the standard
of living, and a social aspect, which affects the level of integration into
the broader society. Both of these aspects, moreover, can be conceptualized
at the level of the individual or of social groups and serve a measure of
the level of integration and inequality for the society as a whole.
The American discussion similarly addresses both material and social
dimensions. Some of this literature follows Bourdieu (1980) and Coleman
(1988) in placing primary emphasis on social capital as an individual-
level resource in arenas such as educational attainment, labor markets,
business, and politics. Other scholars, notably Putnam (1993, 1996, 2000)
and Portes (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes 1998, 2000) stress the
macrolevel characteristics of social capital. Portes has placed primary
emphasis on homophilous social capital, particularly within the context
of ethnic communities, which he refers to as “bounded solidarity” (Portes
1998) and which corresponds to what Gittell and Vidal (1998) refer to as
“bonding” social capital. As Portes (1998) and Waldinger (1995) have ar-
gued, bounded solidarity can be a resource for an immigrant community,
but it also can be a source of deprivation when practiced by more priv-
ileged groups (e.g., white ethnic workers in the construction trades) to
exclude new ethnic groups from jobs.
Contrasting to “bounded solidarity” or “bonding” social capital is what
Gittell and Vidal (1998) called “bridging” social capital, which concerns
extracommunity ties and fosters integration in the larger society through
heightened levels of trust (Woolcock 1998; Fukuyama 1995; Gambetta
1988; Putnam 2000). When trust is low, social isolation is high. High in-
group trust (high “bonding” social capital) but low out-group trust (low
“bridging” social capital) “bolsters narrow identities” and “may create
strong out-group antagonism” according to Putnam (2000, p. 23). In con-
trast, “bridging” social capital involves connections that “are outward
looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages” (Putnam
2000). The combination of “bonding” and “bridging” social capital ar-
guably correspond to the condition of “generalized trust” (Putnam 2000)
where one thinks that “people in general can be trusted” because one
actually has experience interacting with people who are both similar to
and different from oneself (Paxton 2007).
Prominent scholars claim to have found disintegrationist trends in
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American patterns of association. Putnam provided numerous sources of
evidence for declining civic engagement and concluded his book Bowling
Alone by arguing that “the evidence from our inquiry shows that this
longing is not simply nostalgia or ‘false consciousness.’ Americans are
right that the bonds of our communities have withered, and we are right
to fear that this transformation has very real costs” (2000, p. 402). Skocpol
and Fiorina (1999) reached somewhat similar conclusions, namely that
Americans were increasingly detached from the kinds of cross-class mem-
bership organizations that had once defined the landscape of voluntary
association in America, to be replaced by nominal memberships (what
Putnam called “mailing list” memberships) that were primarily defined
by paying dues rather than actual social interaction.2
Other forms of evidence paint a mixed picture. Residential segregation
between blacks and whites declined between 1970 and 2000, although
not to a large extent and not uniformly, while Asian and Hispanic resi-
dential segregation has slightly increased (Massey and Denton 1993; Ice-
land et al. 2002; Frey and Myers 2005). Families have become more
heterogeneous, and interracial marriages in particular have increased.
although they remain relatively rare (Ellwood and Jencks 2004; Gullick-
son 2006). Meanwhile, abundant evidence has emerged concerning the
growing correlation of statuses in American society, a process that Blau
(1977) characterized as the “consolidation” of social parameters. This
growing correlation opposes the mild integrationist trend that some see
in the residential segregation data. In particular, the association between
income and family type has increased (Burtless 1999). The association
between wife’s education and husband’s education has increased (Schwa-
rtz and Mare 2005). The association between income and political par-
tisanship has increased (McCarty et al. 2006). Our own calculations from
the GSS have established that the association between being married with
children and being a frequent church attender increased, the association
between being married with children and being politically conservative
2 Not all scholars agree with Putnam that social capital has declined, including Ladd
(1996) and Wuthnow (1998). Costa and Kahn (2003) analyzed trend data on social
capital in multiple data sets including the DDB Life Style Surveys, the Current Pop-
ulation Surveys, the General Social Surveys, the National Election Studies and time
diary studies conducted at multiple points in time. Costa and Khan reported that some
measures of social capital declined over time, while others did not. There was no strong
trend in rates of volunteering across the multiple data sets that they studied. GSS data
show the strongest trend in membership organizations involved religious organizations.
Membership in professional organizations actually rose considerably, while in other
nonchurch organizations, membership rates changed very little. Costa and Khan’s
analysis of time-trend data agrees with Bianchi et al. (2006) in finding declines in
socializing time with friends and relatives, though much of this decline appears to
involve the frequency of interaction rather than the existence of ties per se.
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increased, and the association between being a frequent church attender
and being politically conservative increased. All other things equal, one
would expect that a rising correlation of statuses would imply a lower
frequency of “cross-cutting status sets” and “cross-cutting cleavages” and
higher levels of values polarization and conflict (Merton 1957; Coleman
1957; Lipset 1963). Consistent with this expectation is Lee’s (2007) finding
that generalized trust has been declining in the United States for the past
30 years. Also consistent is the work of Poole and Rosenthal (2000), who
documented a growing distance between the political positions of the
median Democrat and the median Republican since roughly the middle
1970s. While DiMaggio et al. (1996) found no evidence for a growing
values divide as of the middle 1990s, analyses of more current trend data
by Evans (2003) show growing evidence that “partisan” Americans (those
who label themselves as liberals or conservatives) were becoming polar-
ized around moral issues such as abortion, sexuality, and school prayer
(see also Green 1996; Mouw and Sobel 2001; Brooks 2002; Frank 2004;
and Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).
Recent studies suggest that the absolute level of connectedness of Amer-
icans depends upon the character of the relationship tie elicited by the
survey question. Zheng et al. (2006) obtained a median network size es-
timate of 610 based on the 1998 McCarty et al. (2001) survey that asked
respondents questions of the form “How many people do you know who
[are in group X]?” A 2006 Pew-funded survey instead queried respondents
about their strong ties using the prompt
Let’s start with the people you feel [alternatively SOMEWHAT CLOSE TO
or VERY CLOSE TO], which might include those you discuss important
matters with, regularly keep in touch with, or are there for you when you
need help. Thinking about ALL the people who fit this description and who
do NOT live with you, how many are. . .
Using these prompts, Boase et al. (2006) found that Americans had a
median of 35 somewhat close ties and 15 very close ties.
The 2004 GSS used a different prompt and reported a much lower
level of connectedness (McPherson et al. 2006). In both the 1985 and the
2004 surveys, the GSS interviewer asked
From time to time, most people discuss important matters with other people.
Looking back over the last six months—who are the people with whom you
discussed matters important to you? Just tell me their first names or initials.
IF LESS THAN 5 NAMES MENTIONED, PROBE: Anyone else? [NORC
interviewer writes down just the first five names and then asks further ques-
tions about these names.]
In 1985, the mean GSS respondent reported that he/she had discussed
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important matters during the past six months with 2.9 individuals out of
a maximum of 5. In 2004, in contrast, the mean was only 2.1, and one-
quarter of 2004 respondents (later revised to 22.5% in McPherson et al.
[2008]) offered no names in response to this question versus 10% in 1985
(McPherson et al. 2006). This high estimate has recently been criticized
by Fischer (2009), and both Fischer and McPherson et al. (2009) appar-
ently now agree that the 22.5% estimate of social isolates is at least partly
an artifact of the data collection process in the 2004 GSS (McPherson et
al. 2009). Regardless of the correct answer, however, estimates of core
network size cannot by themselves reveal the level of social integration
achieved through social interaction because much of this interaction oc-
curs with associates who would not be characterized as “strong ties.”
STRONG AND WEAK SOCIAL TIES ACROSS “DIVERSE SOCIAL
CLEAVAGES”
Putnam argued in Bowling Alone that the bonding/bridging distinction
is “perhaps the most important” dimension along which social capital
could vary but that he could find “no reliable, comprehensive, nationwide
measures of social capital that neatly distinguish ‘bridgingness’ and
‘bondingness,’” which caused him to deemphasize this distinction in his
empirical analysis and focus instead on the simpler question of whether
social capital in general had declined (Putnam 2000, pp. 22, 23). Despite
the large body of empirical literature on social networks, his conclusion
about the state of available evidence remains accurate for two reasons.
First, more attention has been paid in homophily studies to some statuses
than to others, which leaves gaps in our understanding about potential
barriers to social interaction. Second, and more fundamentally, we lack
good data about the structure of complete social networks–including the
weak ties as well as the strong ones.
As McPherson et al. (2001) discuss, studies of association range from
marriage (Kalmijn 1998) and confidants and friends (Marsden 1988; Ver-
brugge 1977, 1983) to mere contact (Wellman 1996), to knowing about
someone (Hampton and Wellman 2001) or appearing with them in a public
place (Mayhew et al. 1995). This literature documents multiple dimensions
of homophily, including age, gender, race, and socioeconomic status. How-
ever, much of what is known about the level of homophily in social
networks concerns close relationships (Moody 2001), largely because of
the methodological difficulty of gathering information about people to
whom one has relatively weak ties.
Race is typically identified as the dimension along which social networks
are most segregated. Most of the evidence for this assertion comes from
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the study of close ties of marriage, kinship, and friendship, especially
school friendships or core-network designs such as the 1985 and 2004
GSS (Marsden 1988; McPherson et al. 2001). Marsden’s (1987) study of
the 1985 GSS questions about core social networks found that only 8%
of adults with networks of size 2 or more reported being tied to someone
of a different race. Marsden estimated this frequency as only one-seventh
as high as one would expect if people sorted themselves at random. Many
studies have similarly found strong evidence of segregation in racial
friendships (e.g, Quillian and Campbell 2003; Moody 2001; Mouw and
Entwisle 2006). But, to repeat, these studies are almost always about close
ties. Little is known about interracial acquaintanceships made at work,
in the neighborhood, or in voluntary associations.
Even less is known about ties among Americans with different religious
practices or political preferences. McPherson et al. (2001) argued that
marriage, friendship, and confiding relations are homophilous with respect
to religion, though religious homophily is not typically as strong as race
or ethnicity (Laumann 1973; Marsden 1988; Fischer 1982; Louch 2000).
Kalmijn (1998) reported that marital homophily with respect to religion
appears to be declining. McPherson et al. (2001) note that some religious
groups (e.g., Jews) clearly display homophily in their choice of friends and
spouses. In contrast, they conclude from their review of the literature that
religion—by which they primarily mean religious denomination—“may
not matter much at all” in relationships that are not close. According to
McPherson et al. (2001), the main exception concerns fundamentalists and
members of sects, for whom religion has become something of a total
environment.3 Similarly, McPherson et al. (2001) report that people form
ties based on a similarity of values as well as of social statuses, but the
extent to which this generalization covers weak ties outside friendship
groups or core social networks is an open question.
Many scholars have offered speculation about the relationship between
tie strength and level of homophily. The principle underlying Granov-
etter’s “strength of weak ties” hypothesis was that weak ties provided
connections to people who were more occupationally and socioeconom-
ically dissimilar from oneself than did strong ties (Granovetter 1973; see
also Lin 1999). Putnam similarly argued that close ties were more likely
to be with people like oneself, while weak ties were more likely to be
with people who are different from oneself. Smith-Lovin (2007), following
Blau (1977), argued that homophilous as well as multiplex ties are more
3 Wuthnow (2002, 2003) also finds that religious involvement does not have a net effect
on having friends with lower status or with higher status people. Ties to higher status
people, in contrast, do tend to be higher for those who are members of religious
congregations or who have leadership positions in these congregations.
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likely to be strong ties, while ties among dissimilar others are more likely
to be weak. The 2004 GSS data, however, suggested that multiplex ties
are uncommon even within core social networks (Smith-Lovin 2007).
The major challenge for testing these ideas is that relatively little is
known about the structure of weak ties. Research using position gener-
ators (Lin et al. 2001) and resource generators (Van Der Gaag and Snijders
2005) has focused more on the specific issue of instrumental ties in the
labor market than on the broader question of social integration. So-called
complete network designs, in which the connections between all members
of some relevant subpopulation are collected (e.g., the Newcomb [1961]
fraternity study, the Add Health friendship and sexual relationship study
[Bearman et al. 2004], or the Nang Rong, Thailand, study [Rindfuss et
al. 2004]) obviously miss weak ties that link to others outside the sub-
population under study, and in any case, these designs do not scale well
to the world of adult Americans. The 2006 GSS data, therefore, have the
potential to fill an important gap in scientific knowledge about the struc-
ture of segregation and homophily in complete social networks.
DATA AND METHODS
The data for this study were collected as a special topical module in the
2006 GSS. The basic design was similar to McCarty et al.’s 1998 and
1999 surveys that employed a “How many X’s do you know?” method-
ology in order to estimate the distribution of individuals’ network size
and also to estimate the sizes of special subpopulations that tend to be
hard to count with standard survey methodologies (McCarty et al. 2001).
Our survey differed from the McCarty et al. surveys in its focus on ties
to highly salient groups that define important sources of heterogeneity
among Americans and potentially important sources of social cleavage.
Our survey also differed from McCarty et al. in the type of relationships
that we measured and in the several subsets of a person’s full network
that our questions pertained to.
We asked about two types of relationships: acquaintanceship and gen-
eralized trust.E Our prompt concerning acquaintanceship was as follows:
I’m going to ask you some questions about all the people that you are ac-
quainted with (meaning that you know their name and would stop and talk
at least for a moment if you ran into the person on the street or in a shopping
mall). Again, please answer the questions as best you can.
The second type of relationship that we studied concerned trust.
Coleman defined trust as the willingness to place intellectual, financial,
physical, or other resources at the disposal of another party (Coleman
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1990).4 An individual usually trusts one’s friends, but there are other
people one may trust who do not qualify as friends, such as kin, or
mentors, or people that one has a service or business relationship with.
The extent of one’s trust relationships may in turn be related to one’s
level of “generalized trust,” that is, one’s belief about the trustworthiness
of the average person or of the “benevolence of human nature in general”
(Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). Our trust question is about the re-
spondent’s specific trust relationships as opposed to generalized trust and
was elicited with the following prompt:
Now I’m going to ask you some questions about people that you trust, for
example good friends, people you discuss important matters with, or trust
for advice, or trust with money. Some of these questions may seem unusual
but they are an important way to help us understand more about social
networks in America. Please answer the questions as best you can.
Following the prompts concerning acquaintanceship or trust, the GSS
interviewers asked respondents a series of “How many of the people that-
you-are-acquainted-with/that you-trust are named [one of a set of names]”
in order to estimate the size of the respondent’s network (i.e., the network
degree).5 The interviewers then asked about specific ties with people at
various socioeconomic levels, people who were members of various race
and ethnic groups, people with various religious behaviors, people in
various family types, and people with various political orientations.6 The
specific groups that we asked about are listed in table 1.
It is a general property of human interaction that statuses, behaviors,
and values that are central to one’s own identity may be misperceived
or go unnoticed by one’s acquaintances. A typical person would generally
know the race of people that he is acquainted with, and he may well
4 Tilly’s recent definition of trust is similar: “Trust consists of placing valued outcomes
at risk to others’ malfeasance, mistakes or failures (Tilly 2005, p. 12).
5 We used the following names: Karen, Brenda, Kevin, Shawn, Keith, Rachel, Mark,
Linda, Jose, and Maria. While the estimated level of overdispersion with these names
was relatively low, no names are truly neutral because they vary in frequency by birth
cohort and ethnicity, and these “barrier effects” will bias the estimate of degree size
(Salganik et al., 2008). To take the most obvious example, the popularity of specific
names varies by ethnic group. To determine the size of this bias, we estimated the
data alternatively including and deleting the two Hispanic names (Jose and Maria).
The results were highly similar. To illustrate, the mean posterior mean of the acquain-
tanceship networks differed by less than 0.25% when we alternatively included and
excluded the Hispanic names, and the estimated acquaintanceship overdispersions
varied at most by 4% across the groups analyzed in this article, which was considerably
smaller than the standard errors for these estimates.
6 The question wording was of the form “how many are you pretty certain” are gay
men or women, or attend religious services on a regular basis, or are strongly liberal,
etc.
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know the political ideology, religiosity, or family situation of people that
he knows well. However, he might often not know the political ideology,
religiosity, or family situation of his acquaintances. If he were to count
the number of his associates who are politically liberal, or who are gay,
or who attend religious services on a regular basis, he would (necessarily)
base his count on his perceptions about others. Thus, when two individuals
with the same estimated network size report that they know very different
numbers of people who are politically conservative, there might in fact
be a big difference in the number of political conservatives in their net-
works, or they could instead have similar networks but very different
perceptions about their acquaintances. Regardless of the true level of
integration of acquaintanceship networks, perceived integration is im-
portant because it describes the social world as experienced by the people
who live in it. As Thomas and Thomas (1928) wrote, “If men define
situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”
In the McCarty et al. surveys, the groups being asked about were often
very small (e.g., women who adopted children in the past year or people
who committed suicide in the past year), and respondents were asked to
list the exact number of individuals they knew in each of these groups.
In contrast, our interest encompasses socially prominent groups that typ-
ically have a large membership (e.g., people who are unemployed, or
people the respondent is pretty certain attend religious services rarely or
never), and it is either burdensome or infeasible to ask respondents to
recall the exact number of people they know in these groups. Conse-
quently, we asked respondents to indicate whether the number of people
they knew fell within specific numerical ranges, specifically 0, 1, 2–5, 6–
10, or more than 10.
We asked questions about the number of persons known or trusted in
the respondent’s entire social network. In addition, we asked these ques-
tions with respect to four specified subnetworks: (1) family, relatives, or
in laws, (2) neighbors, (3) people at work or customers or clients, and (4)
people from associations, clubs, preschool, school, or places of worship.
We asked about each of these subnetworks to establish how segregation
with respect to specific groups varied across major “foci of interaction”
within a person’s overall network (Feld 1981). These questions also served
two methodological purposes: they reduced response burden by limiting
the scope for the recall process, and they created additional response
variance concerning the number of ties with persons in the specified social
groups.
Our overall sample size was 1,371. In order to accomplish the project’s
objectives, we subdivided our sample in complex ways. Fifty percent of
the sample were asked the questions about acquaintanceship and trust
concerning their entire social network. The other 50% were divided into
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.68 on Tue, 20 Nov 2012 16:00:14 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Journal of Sociology
1246
four subsamples, and each of these subsamples was asked about ties
within three of the four subnetworks listed above. Figure 1 illustrates the
sample design. Restrictions on total module length caused us to exclude
questions about contact with the same or opposite gender because men
and women make up such large shares of the population that it would
be difficult, given our methods, to measure variation with accuracy.7 We
also omitted questions about contact with groups defined by age or ed-
ucation in order to focus on the cleavages most salient to the current
debate on social integration, namely race/ethnicity, class, religion, political
ideology, and family or romantic relationships. The response rate varied
by question, from 99% for some of the names and the race questions to
95% for having acquaintances who were unemployed or who owned a
second home or were gay to 92% for knowing people who go to church
on a regular basis to 89% for knowing people who never attend church.
The lowest response rate (81%) was for knowing people who “you are
pretty certain are strongly liberal.” The pattern of missing data for the
trust questions was similar to that for the acquaintanceship questions.
Our modeling strategy is described in detail in the appendix (see also
Zheng et al. 2006). We assume that the number of individuals in group
k that are known to individual i (i.e., follows a Poisson model, thaty )ik
is,
y ∼ Poisson(l ),ik ik
where is the expected number of individuals that individual knowsl iik
in group . The main task therefore is to model .k l ik
In a world where associations were made at random, it would be
straightforward to model ; for every individual the expected numberl i,ik
of people in group that she knows would equal the product of the sizek
(degree) of her network multiplied by the fraction of all acquaintanceship
ties that involve group . For example, if 12% of all acquaintanceshipk
ties involved African-Americans, an individual who knows 500 people
would be expected to know 60 African-Americans. More formally, let ai
equal the estimated degree of individual i’s acquaintanceship network
and let equal the proportion of all ties that involve group k. Then webk
could write
y ∼ Poisson (a b ). (1)ik i k
Model (1) is unrealistic because individuals differ in their propensity
to know members of any particular social group. We take this overdis-
persion into account by allowing the relative propensity of individuals to
7 Social networks tend to be relatively gender-integrated, which is another reason for
our excluding gender as a potential dimension of segregation (McPherson et al. 2001).
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know members of group k to differ. We define as the relative propensitygik
of individual to know someone in group , where is the ratio of thei k g
expected number of ties for individual to the number of ties he wouldi
be expected to have if acquaintanceship ties were made at random, that
is,
l ikg p ,ik a bi k
and we elaborate the basic model such that
y ∼ Poisson (a b g ). (2)ik i k ik
We cannot directly estimate the parameters in model (2) because the
number of parameters exceeds the number of data points. Instead, we
integrate out the by assuming that it follows a gamma distribution,gik
and thereby obtain the negative binomial model.
( )y ∼ negative binomial meanp a b , overdispersionp q .ik i k k
where scales the variance of the number of acquaintanceship ties be-qk
tween individuals in the population and members of group , that is,k
V(y )p q E(y ).ik k ik
Higher values of imply greater overdispersion. When is unity, theq qk k
negative binomial model reduces to the Poisson model where the variance
equals the mean.
We use overdispersion as our primary measure of network segregation.
Segregation, homophily, polarization, and overdispersion are related con-
cepts, but they are not exactly the same. DiMaggio et al. (1996) used
“polarization” to refer to three aspects of the distribution of public opinion:
the extent to which opinions on some issue were opposed, the extent to
which attitudes on different issues were correlated (they used the word
“constrained”), and the extent to which attitudes were correlated with
various social statuses (which they referred to as “consolidation”). Taking
opinions one at a time, they measured the level of polarization in terms
of the variance of the attitude distribution (they called this “dispersion”)
and the shape of the distribution (they measured this in terms of kurtosis,
which is related to bimodality).
The related concept of “segregation” is the extent to which people are
separated from each other on the basis of specific statuses, such as race,
gender, or learning difficulties. The separation is typically defined with
respect to some single characteristic of individuals, such as one’s occu-
pation, job, employer, classroom, or the geographic location of one’s res-
idence. It is typically measured in terms of the difference in the distribution
of two or more groups with respect to this characteristic (e.g., as the
percent of each group that would have to be rearranged in order to
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equalize the distributions of the groups). High segregation implies unequal
or at least different group experiences with respect to the characteristic
in question (job, residence, or classroom) and also usually implies lowered
rates of contact to the extent that social interaction is structured by ge-
ography, employer, classroom, and so on.
In this article, we are directly concerned with the level of contact itself
rather than the characteristics that may structure contact, and so we use
the term “segregation,” which is related to the concept of homophily–that
is, the tendency for people to associate with others who are like themselves
on some (or several) particular status or attitude or belief dimensions. We
operationalize network segregation as the extent to which the individual-
level variance in the level of contact with a particular social group (“dis-
persion”) is higher than one would expect under a random mixing model.
In theory, high overdispersion could be produced by low homophily (e.g.,
if people avoided contact with others like themselves), but as a practical
matter (and as we have verified for the 2006 GSS data), overdispersion
is generally produced in large part by homophily. In other words, people
tend to know more people who are in the same statuses as themselves
than one would expect from an assumption of random interaction.
Additional conceptual insight can be obtained by comparing overdis-
persion to measures that have been used in the literature on segregation.
While the index of dissimilarity is the best-known measure of segregation,
researchers have also conceptualized segregation as a measure of inequal-
ity across geographic units (e.g., census tracts) within some larger geo-
graphic area (e.g., metropolitan areas) in the proportion of the minority
population (Massey and Denton 1988). Our model focuses on individuals,
not geographic units, and instead of proportions of persons who are in a
particular group, we model the number of ties that involve a specific
group. The coefficient of variation (CV), which is a standard measure of
inequality (Allison 1978), equals the standard deviation of some resource
divided by its mean. If we conceptualize contact with a specific group as
a resource that may be unequally distributed in the population, then it
follows that
V(y )ik qkCV p p .ik E(y ) a bik i k
If we take the ratio of inequality of contact with members of groups
and for individuals who have the same network size (i.e., the same′k k
value of ), we obtaina
′CV b qk k kp .
′ ′CV b qk k k
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In other words, if contact with groups and is equally overdispersed,′k k
then the inequality of contact with group differs from the inequality ofk
contact with group only as a function of the difference in the relative′k
share of ties that involve groups and .′k k
A related measure of segregation is the index of exposure that was
introduced by Bell (1953), and elaborated by Lieberson (1981; see also
Massey and Denton 1988). The isolation index (which equals one minus
the interaction index) measures the extent to which members of a par-
ticular group are exposed only to one another, rather than to the rest of
the population. This index was written by Lieberson as
N 21 xixP*p ,x X tipi i
where is the number of members of minority group in geographicx xi
unit , is the total population in geographic unit , and X is a scalingi t ii
factor that equals the total number of minority group members across all
geographic units. If we substitute individuals for geographic units, thenN
is analogous to the number of ties between an individual and membersxi
of group , and becomes the size of individual ‘s network. If we reex-x t ii
press this relationship in terms of expectations from our Poisson model
(and refer to group x as group ), we obtaink
N N2(a b g )i k ik 2 2P ∼ p b a g . (3) k k i ikaip1 ip1i
If everyone in the population had the same network size, this expression
becomes a simple function of the variance of the relative propensities in
the population to have ties with members of group , which is related tok
the overdispersion parameter, . Thus, we see that standard measuresqk
of segregation are closely related to the concept of overdispersion used in
this article. Residential segregation measures are typically computed for
specific geographic areas, for example, metropolitan areas. In this article,
we compute measures of overdispersion across the entire country rather
than, for example, distinct metropolitan areas, but this is a consequence
of the nature of our data (a national sample of limited size) rather than
one of the measure; if sufficient data were available, overdispersion mea-
sures for segregation in acquaintanceship or trust networks could also be
computed for individuals living within specific metropolitan areas or other
geographic areas within the United States. The social networks of these
individuals, of course, would generally extend outside the specific geo-
graphic area unless the question restricted the network scope to alters
living in the same area as ego.
Three further issues need to be briefly summarized. Two of these issues
concern the estimation of the size of acquaintanceship or trust networks.
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In model (2), the predicted depends on the product of (the size ofy aik i
ego’s network) and (the proportion of ties that involve group k). Inbk
order to identify and separately, we borrow information about thea bi k
size of the groups from other sources, such as the fraction of the population
with specific names (see the appendix below or McCormick and Zheng
[2007] for details).
The second issue concerning the estimation of network size is recall
error. Prior research demonstrates that individuals find it easier to count
accurately the number of individuals they know from rare groups than
from common groups. Put concretely, it is easier to recall the number of
females that one knows who are named Bethany than it is to recall the
number of males one knows who are named Michael. The average person
in the McCarty et al. data reported knowing 600 persons (McCormick
and Zheng 2007). Someone with a personal network of 600 would be
expected to know about 11 persons named Michael.8 To ease respondent
burden, we used intervals to ask respondents about people they know (0,
1, 2–5, 6–10, or 1 10), but this does not by itself solve the problem of
underreporting. McCormick and Zheng (2007) show that people tend to
overrecall ties involving very rare names and underrecall ties involving
common names. We estimated a recall function to transform the known
proportion of group in the population into an estimate of the fractionk
of network ties that will be recalled to connect with group , and thisk
then gives our estimate of degree size (see the appendix for further details).
Using external information on the frequency of names along with the
recall function works well for estimating the size of acquaintance net-
works, but it gives estimates of the size of trust networks that in our
judgment are too large. The names that we selected for the GSS survey
were only a small fraction of 1% of the American population, which means
that 0, 1, and 2–5 would be typical responses to the question about how
many people of this name one is acquainted with. However, trust networks
are much smaller than acquaintanceship networks. It would have required
another set of more common names—each around 1% of the population—
to estimate the size of the trust network on the basis of trust of people
with a given set of first names. It is also likely that recall problems are
much less severe for the relatively small group of people that one trusts
than for the larger group of people that one is acquainted with. Conse-
quently, applying the recall function estimated from the acquaintanceship
data to the trust network would upwardly bias the estimated number of
people that one trusts. An alternative normalization strategy assumes that
8 For example, while the average respondent in the McCarty et al. data would be
expected to know about 11 persons name Michael, the actual report average was just
under 5 Michaels.
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.68 on Tue, 20 Nov 2012 16:00:14 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Journal of Sociology
1252
the proportion of ties involving racial groups equals their collective pro-
portion in the population. We use the latter strategy in our analysis of
the network of people that one trusts. Our alternative normalization strat-
egy provides estimates of the size of trust networks that closely approx-
imate estimates obtained in a 2006 Pew survey (Boase et al. 2006). This
similarity suggests that the logic underlying our race-normalization strat-
egy is reasonable (see below, and n. 4 above, for additional information).
In any case, our estimates of overdispersion are not affected by our choice
of normalization strategy or by the use of a recall function to estimate
the size of the degree network (see Zheng et al. [2006] for further details).9
The third issue, which we have already mentioned above, concerns the
distinction between observable and hidden statuses. Killworth et al. (2003)
refer to the situation where information about one’s status is not trans-
mitted with equal probability to all people that one knows as a “trans-
mission effect.” Some statuses—most notably skin color—are often
(though not always) observable. Other characteristics such as political
ideology or sexual orientation are not as readily observed, and it might
often be true that a respondent would recall a particular acquaintance
but not necessarily know that the acquaintance was politically conser-
vative, gay, in a cohabiting relationship, or someone who goes to church
on a regular basis. Sometimes the respondent does not know because the
information has low salience for him. In other cases, he may overestimate
the extent to which other people that he knows are like himself (Mc-
Pherson et al. 2001; Goel et al. 2009). Finally, sometimes the information
is masked on purpose by acquaintances who think he would be put off
by this knowledge (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Thus, conservatives may hide
their ideological orientation from liberals, gays may hide their sexual
orientation from those whom they suspect to be homophobic, and so on.
9 One reviewer pointed out that if the roughly 40% of GSS respondents who reported
high generalized trust in fact trusted all of their acquaintances while those with low
generalized trust trusted few of their respondents, the average size of the trust network
would be close to the 220 estimate that we obtained using the names generator plus
the recall function. Arguing against this interpretation is the fact that the specific
prompts in the trust question imply a behavioral connection, not a willingness to believe
that one’s acquaintances are trustworthy. Also arguing against this interpretation are
the findings of Boase et al. (2006), which are similar to the estimates we obtain using
the race groups normalization. Finally, the empirical pattern in the data is not consistent
with the interpretation that generalized trusters trust their acquaintances while low
trusters do not. If we use the high names-based estimate for the size of trust networks,
we find that the median number trusted for those with high generalized trust is much
smaller then the median total number of acquaintances for this subgroup and is only
moderately larger than the median number trusted for those who respond that people
in general cannot be trusted. We conclude that the race-based normalization provides
a more reasonable estimate of the size of trust networks as measured by the prompt
used in the 2006 GSS.
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Generally speaking, we expect these “transmission errors” will make net-
works appear to be more segregated than they actually are and may
contribute to a perception that the United States is a more polarized society
than it actually is (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Baldassari and Bearman 2007;
Gelman et al. 2008). The fact that our estimates will overstate segregation
on certain dimensions is not simple error; instead our findings provide an
accurate estimate of the level of segregation and the extent of “bridging
social capital” that people perceive in their networks.
RESULTS
Acquaintance Networks
The size of acquaintanceship networks varies substantially in the adult
population. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the recall adjusted ac-
quaintanceship network. We estimate that the median person is ac-
quainted with 550 people, with an estimated interquartile range of ap-
proximately 400 to 800.10 Our estimate from the 2006 GSS data is similar
to the 610 estimate of the median made by Zheng et al. (2006) using the
McCarty et al. data (see also Marsden 2005).11 As table 2 shows, the
strongest predictors of acquaintanceship degree in our data are education,
income, race, immigrant status, and church attendance, a pattern that is
consistent with studies that have used other strategies to study social
networks (McPherson 1983; Marsden 1987; McPherson et al. 2006).12 Each
year of education is associated with an increase of 22 people, or about
3%, in one’s acquaintanceship network. Net of education, income also
has a small effect, with each $10,000 in additional family income pre-
dicting an increase of nine acquaintances. Blacks and U.S.-born Hispanics
have smaller estimated networks than do whites, though the difference
10 The estimates we provide included the Hispanic names in the normalization. As
noted above, our estimates differ by a trivial amount if we exclude these names from
the estimation procedure.
11 The Zheng et al. estimate of 610 for the McCarty et al. data was larger than McCarty
et al.’s own estimate of 290 (McCarty et al. 2001) because Zheng et al. used a recall
correction, and because Zheng at al. normalized using the rarer names from the
McCarty et al. data (McCarty et al. normalized using common names from the data).
Our estimate of 550 is also similar to that obtained by McCormick et al. (2010), who
used a more sophisticated approach to take barrier effects into account related to the
different distribution of names across birth cohorts.
12 In supplementary models, we also included measures of the natural logarithm of
size of place and dummy variables for region. Size of place does not have a significant
effect on the size of acquaintanceship networks, net of the other covariates in the
model. Net of other covariates, inhabitants of New England tended to have larger
acquaintanceship networks, while those in middle and south Atlantic states tended to
have relatively small acquaintanceship networks.
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Fig. 2.—Estimated distribution of number of acquaintanceships
is not statistically significant net of other covariates in the model. However,
members of other races and foreign-born Hispanics have estimated ac-
quaintanceship networks that are 26% smaller than those of whites, and
respondents who attend church on a weekly basis have 25% larger net-
works (about 150 people) than do those who rarely or never attend church,
net of other covariates. The added network members of frequent church
members are presumably the people that respondents know from their
participation in religious services and other activities at their places of
worship. The relatively small networks of the foreign born and of re-
spondents who are neither white, black, nor Hispanic suggests greater
social isolation for respondents who migrated to this country and for those
who belong to relatively small population groups (cf. Blau 1977), though
our methodology may understate the network size for these latter groups
of Americans.13
13 We also estimated models with separate effects for black and Hispanic and with a
separate effect for foreign born. The point estimates for black and U.S.-born Hispanic
were similar. The coefficients for (1) foreign-born Hispanics, (2) other races, (3) U.S.
born and other races, and (4) foreign born were also similar, and therefore we combined
race and foreign-born categories in the more parsimonious model presented here. The
more parsimonious model also more clearly shows the differences by race and foreign
born that are statistically significant at conventional levels. At the same time, we
acknowledge that the acquaintanceship networks of members of other races may be
underestimated because the names of their racial/ethnic groups are not represented in
the name prompts that we used in the GSS survey. More precise information about
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TABLE 2
Regression of Acquaintanceship Degree (AD) on Selected Covariates
AD Log of AD
Covariate Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Ages 30–64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 45 .047 .06
Ages 66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 57 .039 .08
Highest year of school completed . . . . 22** 5 .033** .01
Total family income (in $10,000) . . . . . . 10* 4 .015* .01
Income is missing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 49 .063 .07
Female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 30 .040 .04
Black or Hispanic, U.S. born . . . . . . . . . 63 40 .079 .06
Foreign born or other race . . . . . . . . . . . . 147* 63 .26** .09
Attend church sometimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 35 .093 .05
Attend church weekly or more . . . . . . . 149** 39 .25** .05
Moderate political views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 43 .012 .06
Conservative political views . . . . . . . . . . 79 52 .11 .07
Widowed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 61 .11 .08
Divorced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 43 .076 .06
Separated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 95 .042 .13
Never married . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 42 .018 .06
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265** 97 5.7** .13
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 .14
Note.—Np 647.
* P ≤ .01.
** P ≤ .05.
Estimated overdispersions in acquaintanceship social networks (me-
dians and interquartile ranges) are presented in the second and third
columns of table 3. The overdispersion parameters provide an estimate
of the ratio of the true variance to the variance from the null model of
random mixing. In the case of people named “Kevin,” the estimated me-
dian overdispersion is 1.7. So for example, if ego knows 900 people, and
if 1% of all people are named Kevin, then ego would be expected to know
nine people named Kevin under the null model with a standard deviation
of 3. An overdispersion of 1.7 implies that the standard deviation of the
number of Kevins known to people with 900 acquaintances is inflated
from 3 upward only slightly to 3.9 people (i.e., 3 multiplied by the square
root of 1.7). In general, the overdispersions for groups defined by names
were low, which supports our using these names to estimate the distri-
bution of network degree in the GSS sample. In contrast, overdispersion
is much greater for ties with groups defined by or related to class, race,
political orientation, or religiosity. For example if 5% of social ties involved
the unemployed, then a person who knew 500 people would be expected
these groups would require a more survey with a larger sample size or with an overs-
ample of those in the “other race” category.
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under the assumption of random mixing to know 25 unemployed people
with a standard deviation of 5. In fact, we estimate the standard deviation
to be 16, implying an approximate 95% confidence interval of 0–57, which
is wider than the 15–35 confidence interval in a world of random mixing.
In other words, the social networks of actual Americans are more het-
erogeneous than the random mixing model would predict, with some
people knowing very few unemployed persons, while for others more than
10% of their acquaintances are unemployed.
The existing literature, which is largely based on information collected
about a few close ties, reports that segregation on the basis of race outstrips
by far segregation on other social variables. Our data clearly support
earlier findings showing a high degree of segregation on the basis of race.
Because whites are numerically dominant, we cannot accurately estimate
the level of overdispersion of the number of whites one is acquainted
with.14 For blacks and Hispanics, however, our results show overdisper-
sion parameters of about 9 or 10. In a network of 500 acquaintanceships,
we would expect at random about 12% black and Hispanic acquaintances,
or 60 blacks and Hispanics each out of 500, and a standard deviation of
about 8, and so 95% of social networks would have between 44 and 76
of each group. Instead, the estimated standard deviation is on the order
of 25, giving a 95% band of about 10–110 for each group.15
Another way to illustrate the meaning of overdispersion is to compare
our estimated probabilities of being acquainted with especially few or
especially many members of any particular group against the benchmark
of random mixing. Table 4 shows the estimated number in a 400-person
network (the twenty-fifth percentile of estimated network size) that would
belong to each of the measured subgroups based on the proportion that
each of these groups constitutes of the American population. We then
compare the probability of knowing 10 or fewer in each of these groups
under the assumption of random mixing with the estimates from our
model based on the actual patterns of segregation found in the data. The
probability of having 10 or fewer acquaintanceships out of a 400-person
network in each of these groups would be extremely small under the
assumption of random mixing. In contrast, we estimate the probabilities
of having such segregated networks to be actually much larger than the
random benchmarks would suggest. For example, our model predicts that
14 The highest response category for our questions was “more than 10.” Almost everyone
knows more than 10 whites, and so we have relatively little information about ov-
erdispersion for this group. Because we did not assume a hierarchical model for the
overdispersion parameters themselves, the imprecise estimate for the white group does
not affect the estimates for the other groups.
15 If anything, these estimates probably underestimate the actual overdispersion, in
that the majority of acquaintances of many blacks may also be black.
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TABLE 4
Deviation from Random in 400-Person Acquaintanceship Networks






Are unemployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 .00 .18 202
Own second homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 .00 .06 55
Are in prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.00 .91 0
Are Asian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 .05 .33 9
Are black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 .00 .01 11,000
Are Hispanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 .00 .00 11,000
Are whites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 .00 .00 11,000
Are gay men or women . . . . . . . . 20 .01 .17 19
Are cohabitating women . . . . . . 17 .05 .28 7
Attend church regularly . . . . . . . 125 .00 .00 11,000
Attend church rarely/never . . . . 168 .00 .00 11,000
Are strongly liberal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 .00 .00 11,000
Are strongly conservative . . . . . 78 .00 .00 11,000
18% (as opposed to 1 in a 1,000) know 10 or fewer unemployed persons,
33% know 10 or fewer Asians, and 17% know 10 or fewer gay people.16
To put it another way, segregated networks in terms of each of these social
groups is much more common than would be expected if people mixed
without regard to the statuses or behaviors that define these groups.
McPherson et al. summarized the sparse knowledge about acquain-
tanceship networks to the effect that “in relationships of less closeness,
religion may not matter much at all” (2001, p. 426). While this may be
true if religion is operationalized as denomination, our results show that
perceived segregation by religiosity (i.e., the frequency of attendance at
places of worship) is at roughly the same level as perceived segregation
on the basis of class or race. All three of these variables have overdis-
persions that are on the order of 10. It is, of course possible that regular
churchgoers are simply ignorant of the behavior of acquaintances not in
their congregations, while those who rarely go to church are simply un-
16 The estimated number of people in a 400-person network whom one perceives to
belong to any particular social group is of course greater than the estimated number
of people in this group that one would recall from a 400-person network. The illus-
tration could equally well have been worked out for the recalled network as for the
total network, and the results would be the same, with the caveat for both cases that
the overdispersion refers to what ego thinks he knows about the people in his network
rather than what these people know about themselves.
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aware of the behavior of their churchgoing acquaintances.17 We think it
unlikely, however, that associational segregation on the basis of perceived
religious behaviors would be nearly as high as associational segregation
on the basis of race if religious behavior were not an important factor
structuring interaction even among acquaintances. We estimate that the
chances of knowing no one (or thinking that one does not know anyone)
who goes to church regularly, no one who is unemployed, no one who is
gay, no one who cohabits, no one who is strongly liberal, or no one who
is strongly conservative is always at least 5 times and as much as 11 times
higher in American social networks than would be true under random
mixing. Our results suggest a polyvalent pattern of segregation in Amer-
ican social networks that challenges the conventional wisdom that “race
and ethnicity are clearly the biggest divides in social networks” (Mc-
Pherson et al. 2001, p. 6).18
Table 3 shows that the pattern of segregation varies across subnetworks.
Naturally, race and ethnicity are most highly segregated within families,
where integration occurs only either through intermarriage, or through
members of mixed-race and mixed-ethnic families assuming different ra-
cial or ethnic identities. Outside of the family, race and ethnic segregation
are generally of comparable size within the neighborhood, voluntary as-
sociations, and the workplace, with acquaintances involving blacks being
somewhat less overdispersed at work than in neighborhoods. It is, of
course, well known that residential segregation in the United States tends
to be pronounced, and segregation in neighborhood-based acquaintances
is therefore not a surprise. It is also well known that schools, churches,
and social organizations are highly segregated by race. The average cen-
17 Some of the overdispersion in ties to those who attend church regularly arises from
the fact that, as we showed earlier, regular churchgoers tend to have larger acquain-
tanceship networks, and these “extra” acquaintances are homophilous with respect to
church attendance. In other words, religiosity raises the level of segregation of social
networks by making the networks of churchgoers bigger in a nonrandom way. A similar
process would be at work if the “extra” acquaintances that one has by virtue of being
highly educated or well paid tend to be like oneself. Perhaps bankers tend to know
incrementally more rich people by the nature of their job, while the incremental ac-
quaintances that doctors have from their medical practices better approximate random
mixing. Whatever the process that determines the size and characteristics of networks,
the overdispersion parameters express the extent of segregation in these networks as
perceived by ego.
18 We noted earlier that the highest nonresponse rates were for the religiosity and
political ideology questions. If nonresponders to the religiosity and political ideology
did not answer the question because they did not know whether any of their acquain-
tances were in a specific category, their missing answers could be interpreted as not
knowing anyone who they were sure fit the description. In such a case, our estimated
overdispersions underestimate true overdispersion in ties to people that one perceives
as belonging to these categories.
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sus-tract-level index of black-white dissimilarity in the 50 largest met-
ropolitan areas of the United States is .62, while the average census-tract-
level Hispanic-white index of dissimilarity is .48 (Charles 2003). Our recent
knowledge about workplace segregation derives from EEO-1 data on
private establishments with 50 or more employees (Robinson et al. 2005).
Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2006) found that American establishments had
a mean white-black dissimilarity index of about .35 and a similarly sized
white-Hispanic dissimilarity index.19 However, they argue that this num-
ber is an underestimate, first because it excludes establishments that are
racially homogeneous, and second because it is based on the highly ag-
gregated EEO nine-category occupational classification. In contrast, Hell-
erstein and Neumark (2008) ignored occupation and estimated a dissim-
ilarity index for blacks and whites of .19 in a sample of establishments
with at least 40 employees based on the 1990 long form census data merged
with the Census Bureau’s Standard Statistical Establishment List.20
Table 3 suggests lower levels of associational segregation involving
African-Americans at work than in the neighborhood. Segregation in-
volving Hispanic or Asian neighborhood acquaintances is clearly lower
than is segregation involving black acquaintances. Segregation involving
Hispanic or Asian acquaintances through voluntary associations is sim-
ilarly lower than is segregation involving black acquaintances. We do not
have the data to disentangle the various associational contexts within
which Americans mix, but certainly religious activities play a major role.
It is well known that religious congregations are highly segregated by
race (Dougherty 2003; Vischer 2001), though little hard evidence exists to
support the speculation that segregation at church is greater for blacks
than for other racial groups. Whatever its cause, these gradients by racial
group deserve further investigation.
The second striking pattern in table 3 is the extent to which “bridging”
social capital is more likely to be found within families than in the as-
sociations and business organizations that make up the public sphere.
There is less overdispersion in knowing the unemployed or people with
a second home in the family than at work, within associations, or in
neighborhoods. The same is true for prisoners. Acquaintanceship ties with
gays are also less segregated within the family than at work, in associ-
ations, or in neighborhoods. This pattern may partly be explained by the
19 Roughly 15% of establishments were missing either blacks or whites and roughly
20% of establishments were missing either Hispanics or whites (Tomaskovic-Devey et
al. 2006).
20 Racial or ethnic segregation by job is conceptually quite different from racial or
ethnic acquaintanceship at work, because people potentially interact both vertically
(i.e., between superiors and subordinates) and horizontally at the workplace.
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fact that American families have become more heterogeneous over time,
and therefore it is more likely that people who are dissimilar with respect
to class or prison status will be located in the same family than in the
past. It is probably also harder to ignore or be misinformed about statuses
or behaviors within the family than it is at work, in associations, or even
in the neighborhood. In other words, the greater amount of shared in-
formation about family members may produce a closer correspondence
between the diversity of networks as they really are and as they appear
to ego in the family than in more public contexts. Neither explanation
diminishes the irony of this striking finding.
The names “Mark” and “Linda” show a greater level of overdispersion
at work and in associations than in neighborhoods or families. We suspect
that this pattern reflects greater age segregation at the workplace or in
associations than would be found in neighborhoods or families, where
people of different ages are likely to interact with each other. Mark, for
example, was the sixth most popular boy’s name for cohorts born in the
1960s, but ranked 181st in the 1930s and 34th in the 1980s. Meanwhile,
Linda ranked 2d in the 1940s, 317th in the 1920s, and 128th in the 1980s.
When names change popularity over time, more highly age-segregated
networks will show greater overdispersion than will less age-segregated
networks.
Perceived segregation of acquaintances by church attendance or polit-
ical ideology are about equally segregated in the family, in the neighbor-
hood, and at work. Glaeser and Ward (2006) estimated that the index of
dissimilarity by political party at the national level is about .2 when
counties are the unit of analysis. This is much lower than standard results
for residential segregation at the tract level, but these numbers are not
readily comparable. Counties are much bigger than tracts, and county-
level racial segregation is doubtless much lower than is tract-level seg-
regation. However, racial segregation within counties is very high, while
the level of political segregation within counties is an unknown. Religiosity
is much more segregated within associations than at work or in the neigh-
borhood, but this is not surprising given that the category of associations
includes places of worship. Political ideology is similarly more segregated
within voluntary associations than it is at the workplace or in the neigh-
borhood. Certainly it is not the case that political associations are a central
aspect of the associational life of Americans, but people appear to choose
associations or choose whom to associate with in associations in order to
produce a greater level of perceived ideological segregation than they
experience in their neighborhoods or workplaces. The high level of ov-
erdispersion by political ideology in voluntary associations that are offi-
cially organized on other principles could be a product of consolidation
(Blau 1977), that is, where one dimension of belief or behavior (e.g., re-
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ligious belief or religiosity) is highly correlated with another belief (political
ideology). It is, of course, also possible that people more readily attribute
their beliefs to others in voluntary associations that—members may rightly
or wrongly assume—bring together other people with similar beliefs to
their own.
Trust Networks
The number of individuals that one trusts is obviously smaller than the
number of people that one is acquainted with, but how much smaller?
As noted above, McPherson et al. 2008 (see also McPherson et al. 2006,
2009) found that the mean size of core networks (as measured by the GSS
question concerning a list of people one has “discussed important matters
with” in the last six months) dropped from 2.9 out of a maximum of 5
in 1985 to 2.1 in 2004, with 22.5% of the sample listing no names at all.
Our 2006 GSS trust question differs from the 2004 (and 1985) GSS ques-
tions; it broadens the relationship to include friends, and it is closer to
the Coleman idea of trust as the willingness to place material resources
along with information at the disposal of someone else. For these reasons,
it provides an alternative perspective on the level of isolation among
contemporary Americans. We computed the proportion of people in our
sample who reported that they trusted no one at all in any of the social
categories that we asked about (i.e., all the specific names, all the specific
occupations, all races, liberals and conservatives, churchgoers and non-
churchgoers, the unemployed, those in prison, those with a second house,
gays, and cohabiting women). Only 1.4% of the 2006 GSS sample reported
that they did not trust any specific person in any of these categories that
we queried about, which is considerably lower than the McPherson et al.
estimate. We further computed the proportion of respondents who did
not trust anyone in all but one of these categories (we let the excepted
category be anything at all). This relaxed criterion only raised the pro-
portion of “extremely low trusters” to 3.1%. It seems that when confronted
with specific prompts for specific types of people, Americans are much
more likely to report that they trust at least some specific individual than
they are to provide the specific name of someone with whom they have
discussed “important matters.”
Our estimate for the degree distribution of the trust network is displayed
in figure 3. The distribution of trust ties is skewed to the right, with an
estimated median of 17 and an estimated interquartile range between 10
and 26.21 These estimates are much higher than the mean of 2.1 reported
21 If we used the names normalization for trust networks along with recall correction,we
would estimate the posterior mean of the median number trusted to be a too-high 220
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Fig. 3.—Estimated distribution of number trusted
out of the 2004 GSS (McPherson et al. 2006) and more in line with the
estimates obtained from the 2006 Pew survey (Boase et al. 2006). Our
results suggest that the multiple prompts in the 2006 “trust” question
wording (good friends, people you discuss important matters with, trust
for advice, or trust with money) and the lack of a six-month scope con-
dition in the 2006 question generate a larger, less close network than does
the 2004 GSS question wording. At the same time, trust networks as
measured by the 2006 GSS question wording are much smaller than
acquaintanceship networks; our estimate of the median number of people
as opposed to the 17 we estimate when using racial groups to perform the normalization.
As noted above, the names we used to estimate degree are too rare to provide a precise
estimate for trust networks, and produce upwardly biased estimates both because of
the tendency for people to “overrecall” ties with rare groups and because recall bias
is—we argue—not as great for smaller trust networks as for larger acquaintanceship
networks. An inspection of table 7 demonstrates the basis for this much larger estimate.
In the raw data, 44% of whites reported that they trusted 10 or fewer specific white
people, 67% of blacks reported that they trusted 10 or fewer specific black people, and
76% of those of other races reported that they trusted 10 or fewer specific Hispanic
people. With such high proportions of the three major race groups having relatively
small trust networks, the estimate of a 220 median seems implausible. We believe the
estimate of 17 is closer to the truth though probably a lower bound on the correct
answer. As noted above, our estimate of the degree size has no impact on our estimates
of overdispersion in connection with the various population groups contained in our
survey data.
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in the close networks tapped by our trust question is only 3% of our
estimate of the median number of people in acquaintanceship networks.22
To establish the determinants of the size of the trust network, we first
estimated a fractional polynomial regression of the estimated size of the
trust network against the estimated size of the acquaintanceship network.
Figure 4 shows the estimated relationship between the number known
and the predicted number trusted along with a scatterplot of the estimated
number trusted against the estimated number known. Among those whose
estimated acquaintanceship degree is in the bottom 25% of the distri-
bution, the predicted number trusted moves from about 5 to about 15,
with virtually everyone in this quartile trusting fewer than 20 people. In
the middle 50% of the distribution, the expected number trusted climbs
from about 15 to about 25. In this range, it becomes more common for
people to report that they trust between 20 and 40 people, even though
there is a persisting minority of respondents who trust very few individ-
uals. Finally, in the top quartile, the expected number trusted climbs from
25 to over 40. A minority of people assert that they trust over 60 people,
while another minority report that they trust very few individuals despite
their large acquaintanceship network.
We next regressed the estimated number trusted on a set of covariates,
and we report the answers in table 5. In model 1, we omit acquaintance
degree. The pattern of coefficients in the trust model is similar to that
reported earlier for the acquaintanceship model as well as to analyses of
other close network data (McPherson 1983; Marsden 1987; McPherson et
al. 2006), and reinforces the conclusion that the predictors of social net-
work size are robust across tie strength and across different strategies for
measuring social networks. In model 2, we include the estimated size of
one’s acquaintanceship network as a covariate. Model 2 suggests that
education and church attendance mostly affected the number trusted be-
cause of their effect on the number of acquaintances, while the effect of
other race or foreign born is diminished. Net of estimated degree size, age
appears to have a curvilinear relationship with trust: young adults over
25 and people over 65 trust a higher proportion of their acquaintances
than do people of other ages. Model 3 includes the generalized trust var-
iable.23 In the absence of any other covariates except for degree size,
22 The large difference in the estimated size of trust and acquaintanceship networks
suggests that respondents correctly reported about specific trust relations rather than
about generalized trust; about one-third of GSS respondents reported in the abstract
that most people can be trusted, which presumably would have included the people
that they themselves were acquainted with.
23 NORC asked the generalized trust question to approximately two-thirds of the GSS
sample that was also asked our questions about trust, and so the sample size for model
3 is smaller than for models 1 and 2.
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Fig. 4.—Number trusted versus number known
generalized trust has a significant effect on the number trusted; those who
think that people mostly can be trusted trust an estimated 15% more
people (net of estimated degree size) than do people who disagree that
most people can be trusted (results available upon request from the au-
thors). In the presence of other covariates, however, the effect of gener-
alized trust on the degree of one’s trust network is weakened below the
conventional threshold of statistical significance.24 When generalized trust
as well as degree size are controlled, church attendance again becomes a
significant predictor of the size of one’s trust network; net of other factors,
those who attend church weekly or more trust about 20% more people
than do those who never go to church. We speculate that these additional
people in the trust network are in fact the people that churchgoers go to
church with, but we do not have the data to confirm this.
Next, we address the question of overdispersion in trust networks. The
fourth and fifth columns of table 3 show the level of overdispersion in
the trust networks and table 6 illustrates the impact of overdispersion by
comparing the probability of trusting no one in our salient groups as
compared with the expected outcome under random mixing. As with
acquaintanceship networks, overdispersion is highest for racial groups,
but church attendance follows closely behind. Under random mixing, only
13% of people with a median-sized trust network would be expected not
to know of any specific African-American that they trust. In the actual
data, we estimate that 51% of the population knows no African-American
24 However, respondents with high generalized trust know an estimated 70 more people
than do those with low generalized trust. Generalized trust is related to the number
one trusts partly through its association with the number one knows.
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TABLE 5
Regression of the Logarithm of Estimated Trust Degree on
Selected Covariates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ages:
25–34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 .21* .30*
35–44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 .15 .16
45–54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 .11 .16
55–64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 .10 .033
66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 .28** .23
Highest year of school completed . . . . . . . . . . . . .031** .008 .002
Total family income ($10,000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 .001 .003
Income is missing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .025 .025 .081
Female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .078 .052 .006
U.S.-born black or hispanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14* .072 .08
Other race or foreign born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38** .20* .23*
Attend church sometimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15* .078 .12*
Attend church weekly or more . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28** .096 .20**
Moderate political views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .038 .019 .018
Conservative political views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .049 .045 .052
Widowed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 .11 .098
Divorced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .015 .037 .019
Separated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .09 .095 .02
Never married . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .065 .047 .069
Estimated acquaintance degree/100 . . . . . . . . . . .27** .29**
(Estimated degree/100)2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .013** .015**
(Estimated degree/100)3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .000** .000*
Cannot trust most people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Whether one can trust “depends” . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2** 1.4** 1.39**
N of observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 642 642 415
Note.—Np 647.
* P ≤ .01.
** P ≤ .05.
that they trust, 50% knows no Hispanic that they trust, and 76% knows
no Asian that they trust. The effects of overdispersion similarly magnify
the likelihood of trusting no one in groups defined by religiosity or political
ideology relative to the baseline random mixing model. While only 8%
of the population would be expected not to trust a single liberal under
random mixing, our actual estimated probability is 37%. We estimate that
27% of the population do not know any specific conservative person that
they trust; in a world of random mixing, this number would be only 4%.
We elaborate our analysis of racial segregation in trust networks in
table 7 by comparing the actual frequencies of trusting people of other
races that we obtained from the GSS. Other studies have reported that
it is relatively common for blacks and whites to report significant contact
with members of the other race. In a 1989 national survey, 82% of blacks
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TABLE 6
Deviation from Random in Median Size (17) Person Trust Network






Are unemployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 .36 .67 3.6
Own second homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 .36 .57 2.4
Are in prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 .84 .91 1.8
Are Asians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 .49 .76 3.4
Are blacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 .13 .51 7.0
Are Hispanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 .11 .50 8.0
Are whites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 .00 .04 11000
Are gay men or women . . . . . . . . 1 .43 .67 2.8
Are cohabitating women . . . . . . 1 .24 .51 3.3
Attend church regularly . . . . . . . 5 .00 .19 47
Attend church rarely/never . . . . 7 .00 .08 109
Are strongly liberal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 .08 .37 7.0
Are strongly conservative . . . . . 3 .04 .27 9.9
and 66% of whites claimed to have friends of the other race (Sigelman
and Welch, 1993). Jackman and Crane (1986) reported results from a 1975
national sample that showed 10% of whites to have a close black friend,
another 21% with a black acquaintance, and 25% of blacks with a close
white friend.25 Sigelman et al. (1996) reported from their 1992 Detroit
survey that 43% of blacks and 27% of whites said that they had a good
friend of the other race. Marsden’s (1987) study of the 1985 GSS social
network questions found that only 8% of adults with networks of size
two or more reported being tied to someone of a different race.26 As table
7 shows, 37% of whites claim to trust 2 or more blacks, and 28% claim
to trust 2 or more Hispanics in the 2006 GSS, while a small majority of
blacks and a larger majority of people of other races report that they trust
two or more whites. Meanwhile, nearly half of American whites report
no blacks in their trust networks, and about a third of blacks report no
whites in their trust networks. The GSS data suggest greater levels of
interracial contact in 2006 than Jackman and Crain found in 1975, but
less than Sigelman et al. (1996) found in 1989. The first conclusion we
25 Jackman and Crain’s (1986) data used a “stronger” form of acquaintanceship than
we used in our data. Their prompt defined acquaintanceship as people that respondents
“keep in touch with or get together with occasionally.” It seems likely that many people
who would be defined as acquaintances based on knowing their name and stopping
on the street to say hello are not people that one keeps in touch with or gets together
with occasionally.
26 Marsden estimated this frequency as only one-seventh as high as one would expect
if people sorted themselves at random.
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TABLE 7










0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 31 20
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 16 15
2–5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 36 34
6–10 . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4 12
11 . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 14 20
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504 87 61
Blacks trusted:
0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 14 52
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5 16
2–5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 26 24
6–10 . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 23 3
11 . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 33 5
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504 88 63
Hispanics trusted:
0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 64 39
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 12 8
2–5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 21 18
6–10 . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 11
11 . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 24
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506 87 62
draw from this comparison is that estimates of interracial ties are sensitive
to the method of measurement. Our second conclusion is that trust net-
works in the United States remain highly segregated.
As we argued earlier in the paper, little is known about the relative
level of segregation of trust networks vs broader acquaintanceship net-
works. On theoretical grounds, McPherson et al. (2001) predicted that
homophily is stronger in what they refer to as “multiplex” relationships,
in which people have a relationship along more than one dimension. One
corollary of this is that trust networks should be more homophilous than
are acquaintanceship networks, because one is likely to have a more
elaborated structure of ties involving kinship, marriage, and friendship
in addition to more instrumental connections with people that one trusts
than with people that are only acquaintances. Similarly, Putnam (2000)
conjectured that “bonding” ties tend to be with people like oneself; his
question was whether bridging ties would be sufficiently heterophilous to
create a socially integrated society. A comparison of the estimated over-
dispersion in the acquaintanceship and trust results provides a simple test
of this conjecture. In fact, our estimated overdispersions are generally
smaller for trust networks than for acquaintanceship networks. From the
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perspective of ego, trust networks show less variation along key status
and values dimensions than do acquaintanceship networks.
To some extent, the larger overdispersion estimates for acquaintance-
ship networks may reflect variation in recall errors among GSS respon-
dents. Thus, one can see from table 3 that the estimated overdispersion
of names is generally larger (by about 25%) in the acquaintanceship net-
work than in the trust network. However, the estimates of overdispersion
in acquaintanceship for the substantively interesting groups generally ex-
ceed the estimates of overdispersion in trust by more than 25%. More
work is needed to understand the impact of recall error on estimates of
segregation in social networks, but our estimates suggest that perceived
acquaintanceship networks are at least as segregated as perceived trust
networks in contemporary American society.
DISCUSSION
Segregation in American social networks is pervasive across multiple stat-
uses that have been identified as dimensions of potential social cleavage
in the popular press and in the academic literature. Other studies have
found this to be true in the context of core networks. Our data confirm
that segregation is also pervasive in broader acquaintanceship networks
as well. Beyond this confirmation, our data support three major conclu-
sions that constitute a mixed message for those concerned about social
integration. On the optimistic side, we find that trust networks are larger
than the discussion networks estimated with the 2004 GSS and are about
the same size as the close networks estimated with the 2006 Pew survey.
The typical American is able to identify between 10 and 20 individuals
that he trusts. About a quarter of Americans trust fewer than 10 indi-
viduals, and these Americans typically have relatively few acquaintances
as well. At the other extreme are the small but not insignificant group of
Americans who have a large number of acquaintances but trust very few
of them. The typical American has a trusting relationship with only about
one-thirtieth of the people that he or she is acquainted with. This may
sound low, but building a trusting relationship takes time, and most people
may not have enough time in their lives to build more than twenty or so
such relationships.
The greater concern, we suggest, lies not with the size of trusting re-
lationships but rather with the structure of acquaintanceship networks,
which are perceived by ego to be as segregated as trust networks. To say
that core networks are homophilous is almost a truism. However, the
rhythms of modern life often provide the opportunity to interact with
others who are different from oneself. This opportunity is of course not
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a social constant, it depends upon social resources that provide the pos-
sibility to choose where one lives, where one works, and which associations
one is able to join. Within these constraints, people exercise choices about
workplace, place of residence, and about associational participation. Peo-
ple also have at least some control over the people they get to know in
these various settings. When social barriers are high, people of different
races or with different political views or religious orientations may avoid
social interaction to the extent possible or at least may hide social dif-
ferences from those whom they must work with or see on a regular basis.
Structural opportunity mixes with personal preferences to shape the di-
versity of one’s acquaintances, colleagues, coworkers, and associates.
Core networks are different. People are socialized to be like their family
members, and they choose their mates and their friends. It is for this
reason that one expects homophily to be high in core networks. That
acquaintanceship networks are at least as segregated as are core networks
has, we suggest, two potentially important implications. The first, which
is consistent with concerns raised by Putnam, Skocpol, and others, is that
the organizations of American civil society in the American economy do
not play a strongly integrative role in contemporary American society. A
second potentially important implication is that new forces in American
society may provide the basis for increased integration in the “bounded
solidarity” group known as the American family. One of these factors is
rising rates of interracial marriage, and another is the relatively high rate
of instability of both cohabitation and marriage, which increases the rate
of repartnering at older ages and thereby lowers marital homogamy
(Schwartz and Mare 2005). The impact of these trends is magnified by
the relative difficulty of hiding one’s religious orientation, sexual orien-
tation, political orientation, or cohabitation behavior from other family
members. It is also harder to ignore or misperceive the statuses, behaviors,
and values of family members than it is for the statuses, behaviors, and
values of associates and casual acquaintances in the neighborhood, at
work, or in voluntary associations. Growing heterogeneity combines with
willing or unwilling transparency to produce a surprising level of inte-
gration in family interactions across multiple important social dimensions.
Our third major finding is the large magnitude of the segregation on
important socioeconomic, behavioral, and values dimensions. The esti-
mated level of perceived segregation by race in association networks is
roughly on par with the level of perceived segregation by religious be-
havior, employment status, and political ideology. Religion in particular
has emerged as a fundamental cleavage in American society at the level
of day-to-day interaction. From the perspective of the culture wars that
we have seen play out in the American political sphere and the past decade
or so, this may not be surprising. However, it is often assumed that the
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most visible participants in these culture wars are a relatively small num-
ber of partisans. Instead, we find that Americans differ greatly in their
perceived ties to people from the more secular and the more religious
wings of American society. The same is true for political orientation.
Religiosity and political orientation are more difficult to observe than
race, and so “objective” levels of segregation on these dimensions are
probably not as high as people report in the GSS. But perceptions shape
lived experience, and sharp differences in the experienced social worlds
of Americans may impede understanding and tolerance for the views and
lifestyles of those who are different than oneself. We cannot, of course,
measure the extent to which the “objective” and “perceived” acquain-
tanceship networks differ from each other. Therefore, we cannot know
whether the high segregation in acquaintanceship networks comes from
structural factors that objectively segregate Americans into different social
groups, from self-selection processes, or from a combination of masking
and misperception that cause America’s acquaintanceship networks to be
more different from one another in terms of experience than in terms of
actual fact. Nonetheless, our findings point to trust networks, the rough
equivalent of “bonding” social capital, as providing an important com-
plement to weak ties in maintaining social integration in American society.
One cannot readily hide behaviors and values in close networks, and this
fact, coupled with the growing heterogeneity of American families, sug-
gests that families and the close friends associated with them are less
about “narrow identifies” and “out-group antagonisms” than Putnam
feared them to be.
Aside from technical issues concerning measurement and model spe-
cification, there are important substantive questions raised by our results.
One such issue concerns the extent to which our measured levels of seg-
regation are driven by the objective characteristics of the people that
Americans know, and the extent to which they are driven by misperception
or masking of behaviors and opinions that Americans think would be
disapproved of by their associates. A second important issue concerns
trends over time. While our study provides a baseline for the assessment
of future trends, our limited comparisons with previous studies provide
some grounds for concluding that segregation in association by race may
be diminishing or at least is not increasing. We have no firm basis for
drawing any similar conclusions concerning segregation by religious be-
havior, political orientation, sexual orientation or the other variables mea-
sured in the 2006 GSS. Future data collections can provide the basis for
comparisons with existing data to establish a level of stability and change
in segregation of social networks along these dimensions. A final issue
concerns the causes and consequences of network segregation. The Gen-
eral Social Survey provides a good platform for collecting descriptive
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information about social networks and for studying the behavioral cor-
relates of network structure. However, causal estimates involving these
network characteristics cannot readily be obtained from these data, and
imaginative strategies are needed in order to determine the individual
and structural factors that can explain heterogeneity in segregation across
individuals and over time. These are important topics for future research.
APPENDIX
Likelihood Computation
As noted in the data and methods section above, we used intervals (0, 1,
2–5, 6–10, or 1 10) to ask respondents about people they know. The model
originally presented in Zheng et al. (2006) was designed for exact counts.
Although the general structure of the model remains the same, some
computational modifications are necessary to adapt the Zheng et al. (2006)
model for interval data.
Recall that our model takes the form
′( )y ∼ negative binomial meanp a b , overdispersionp q (A1)ik i k k
where is the degree of respondent and is the prevalence of group′a i bi k
— is adjusted using the calibration curve presented in the next section.′k bk
We fit the model in equation (A1) using Bayesian inference. We assume
that the log of the respondent degree parameters, , follows a normallog (a )i
distribution, with mean and standard deviation . Similarly, the logm ja a
of the group parameters, are assumed to follow normal distribu-log (b )k
tions with mean and standard deviation . In both cases the hyper-m jb b
parameters are given noninformative uniform priors. The overdispersion
parameters, , are assumed to follow independent uniform (0,1) distri-qk
butions on the inverse scale. Since overdispersion can fall in the range
the inverse, , is in . This prior specification performed well(0,) 1/q (0,1)k
for Zheng et al. (2006) and is consistent with observations in McCarty et
al. (2001).
The full posterior distribution is then . Since our val-p(a,b,m ,m ,j ,j Fy)a b a b
ues of are intervals, we can partition the posterior based on theseyik
categories. Say that, given the option, the respondent would report that
she/he knows an exact count of individuals in group . Then, let bez k ik
the indicator of the interval that an observation belongs to. Then, therezik
are intervals, one for each level of , with each interval containingL yik
one or more potential values of . For example, if a respondent knewzik
three members of group ( ) she would report “2–5” ( ),k z p 3 y p 2–5ik ik
which corresponds to , the third interval. For clarity, let be thep 3 yik()
interval of that corresponds to level . Our likelihood is expressed asy ik
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n KL h zik ik1 h  1z  h  1 ikik ikp(a,b,m ,m ,j ,j Fz) ∝   a b a b ( ) ( ) ( )h  1ip1 kp1 q qp1 z y ikik ik() k k
n K
2 2# N[log (a )Fm ,j ] N[log (b )Fm ,j ] i a a k b b
ip1 kp1
# I(z  y ),ik ik ( )
′a bi k/(q 1)kwhere h p e and I(z  y )ik ik ik ( )
is an indicator variable taking the value one if the observation is in group
and zero otherwise. The final interval (110) has an unlimited number of
possible values. This is not problematic since we can equivalently performzik
the computation for and subtract from one. Estimation is thenz  [0,10]ik
carried out using Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) in a fashion similar
to Zheng et al. (2006).
Calibration Curve
In this section we give additional details about the motivation, derivation,
and application of the calibration curve. Killworth et al. (2003) documents
that respondents have difficulty recalling accurately their ties in large
subpopulations and proposes several mechanisms to explain the under-
recall. One possible explanation is a process that Killworth et al. (2003)
calls “dredging,” whereby a respondent recalls one-by-one the first ac-m
quaintances and then estimates for all groups larger than some size .m
This mechanism would, in theory, produce accurate responses for small
groups (less than acquaintances) but less reliable responses for largerm
groups where respondents are estimating total group size rather than
counting specific acquaintances (McCarty et al. 2001). Though this mech-
anism seems plausible, there is no specific process for determining orm
modeling how estimating rather than enumerating would impact the over-
all accuracy of the results. Additionally, both Killworth et al. (2003) and
McCarty et al. (2001) point out that the relatively short time given to
answer each question likely creates difficulty for respondents and is con-
founded with “dredging.”
Like the Zheng et al. (2006) model, our model has a nonidentifiability
since the likelihood depends on and only through their sum.log (a ) log (b )i k
For clarity, let and . To identify the ’s and ’s the modela bi ka p e b p e a bi i
is renormalized by adding a constant to all ’s and subtracting the con-a i
stant from the ’s. One intuitive way of calculating the renormalzingbk
constant is to set
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bke p {population proportion} . (A2)  k
This is equivalent to assuming that the average degree of individuals
in these subpopulations equals the average degree of the population. Ob-
viously, this assumption does not apply to all of the subpopulations in
our current survey. When restricted to the subpopulations defined by the
first names, however, this assumption is fairly reasonable.
The above strategy also requires that the acquaintance ties recorded
in the survey reflect the distribution of ties in the social network. However,
the survey did not accurately measure the social network but rather the
recalled social network by the respondents. Figure A1 gives a graphical
representation of the distinction between a respondent’s actual and re-
called networks. For rare groups, the respondents can recall almost all
their ties with these groups, indicated by the right side of figure A1. The
number of ties to a large subpopulation is underrecalled. This under-k
recalling is represented in figure A1 by the increasing discrepancy between
the circles corresponding to the recalled and actual respondent network
as the size of the alter group increases. The estimated proportion frombke
data therefore only estimate the proportion of ties involving subpopulation
in the recalled social network. Consequently,k
bk ( )e p g {population proportion}  k
{ }≤ population proportion . k
Here, represents the recall function. If the renormalizing constantg(7)
is computed based on equation (A2) and some popular first names, the
degrees of the respondents will be underestimated.26
Let be the proportion of ties in the social network that involvebke
individual in subpopulation . And let denote the proportion of ties
′b kk e
in the recalled social network that involve subpopulation . Assumek
and is an increasing function.′b p f(b ) f(7)k k
Based on our observation and also independent discussion by Killworth
et al. (2003), we assume that
′ xf (x) r 1 as e r 0 (x r )
1 x ( )r as e r 1 x r 0 .
2
To simplify the inference, we assume that for small populationsf(x)p x
27 Zheng et al. (2006) observed that the estimated average degree is 384 if using all 12
names to normalize, but 739 when normalizing only on the rarer names.
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Fig. A2.—Estimated fractional subpopulation size with and without the calibration curve.
The solid line is the line. Names written in capital letters represent estimates usingyp x
the calibration curve. Lowercase letters are estimates without the calibration curve.
with proportion as small as ( ) and decreases as in-′x c1e p e c ! 0 f (x) x1
creases (at most) to as goes to zero. More specifically, we assume1 x2
1 1′ c (xc )2 1f (x)p  e , c ≥ 0, for x ≥ c ,2 12 2
where controls how fast and how close approaches .′ 1c f (x)2 2
This gives us
1 1
c (xc )2 1( )f(x)p c  (x c ) 1 e .1 12 2c2
In this article, we use , which corresponds to subpopulationsc p 71
that are !.1% of the population and is to be fitted using as originallyc b2 k
estimated and the population proportions of first names. This is because,
as discussed earlier, we assume that in the absence of recall bias, b ≈k
on average. Incidentally, we found that a of{population proportion} ck 2
approximately 1 yielded the best fit.
The names used in our current survey represent subpopulations that
are much smaller than those used in the McCarty et al. surveys. The
McCarty et al. surveys included the name Michael, which represents 1.8%
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of the population. Someone whose personal network size is 600 is expected
to know Michaels. Though imaginable, it is difficult to600# .018 ≈ 11
recall 11 Michaels during the limited amount of time of such a survey;
therefore, the actual reported count is likely to be much lower. In fact,
in the McCarty et al. (2001) data, respondents reported knowing an av-
erage of just under 5 Michaels. In contrast, the six names used here
represent only 1.4% of the population with the largest names, Karen and
Keith, representing about .34% each. Nonetheless, we still observe some
underrecalling among respondents, particularly for these two names. Fig-
ure A2 shows that, particularly for the larger names, using the calibration
curve improves the estimates of the fractional subpopulation size. We
intentionally chose names that were less popular than those used in the
McCarty et al. surveys, but not so rare that most respondents wouldn’t
have any contact with members of the subpopulation. This is mirrored
with a larger issue discussed in further detail in McCormick et al. (2010)
and McCormick and Zheng (2007).
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